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RATIONALISING FRAMING EFFECTS: AT LEAST ONE TASK






SUMMARY: Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is
presented —or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal
counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One
challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing con-
ditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However,
it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that
a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it
actually means. I survey how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded
meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context.
I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical
input.
KEY WORDS: cognitive bias, rationality, number expressions, semantics, pragmatics
RESUMEN: Los juicios humanos se ven afectados por las palabras en las que la
información se presenta “enmarcada”. Según la glosa estándar, el “efecto marco”
revela un razonamiento contra-normativo, indebidamente afectado por el lenguaje
positivo/negativo. Un desafío a este punto de vista sugiere que las expresiones
numéricas en condiciones marco alternativas se interpretan denotando cantidades
de límite inferior (mínimas). Sin embargo, no está claro si la explicación resultante
es racionalizadora. Sostengo que una expresión numérica solo debe interpretarse
con límites inferiores si esto es lo que realmente significa. Examino cómo a las
expresiones numéricas se les pueden asignar significados de límite inferior, debido a
su semántica convencional o al enriquecimiento pragmático en el contexto. Sostengo
que decidir entre estas posibilidades requiere una aportación filosófica fundamental.
PALABRAS CLAVE: sesgo cognitivo, racionalidad, expresiones numéricas, semántica,
pragmática
1 . Introduction
Consider the following experimental scenario, which was first used
in an empirical study conducted by the psychologists Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman (1981):
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Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two al-
ternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.
Assume the exact scientific estimates of the consequences are
as follows:
In one condition, the options are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that
600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no
people will be saved.
In another condition, the options are:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that
nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people
will die.
In both conditions, participants are then asked:
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Tversky and Kahneman found that most participants in the ‘be
saved’ condition favoured Program A —the ‘sure option’ (72% chose
this option, compared with just 28% who favoured the ‘risky option’,
Program B). In contrast, in the ‘die’ condition, most participants
favoured the risky option, Program D (78%, compared with 22%
who favoured the sure option, Program C). This is puzzling on the
standard interpretation of the two conditions, according to which they
describe exactly the same pair of prospects. The mere use of positive
or negative language (‘be saved’ vs. ‘die’) seems to produce a reversal
in people’s preferences —and in their attitude to risk-taking.
Tversky and Kahneman’s ‘Asian Disease Problem’ (ADP) has in-
spired a programme of psychological research into the effects of fram-
ing information in different words —typically, by using language that
is either positively or negatively valenced. In this paper, I will focus
solely on ADP-style ‘risky-choice’ framing paradigms, which elicit
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choices between outcomes occurring with varying degrees of proba-
bility.1 In particular, I will address the question of why seemingly
equivalent options end up being evaluated differently, and whether
this can be a rational response on the part of a decision-maker. The
effects of framing on choice have standardly been interpreted as evi-
dence of counter-normative (irrational or sub-rational) cognitive pro-
cessing. As Bermúdez has recently put it: “The consensus view is that
susceptibility to framing effects is a paradigm of irrationality” (2018,
p. 180). The idea that people are subject to such cognitive biases
has proved extremely influential, both within and beyond academia,
as part of a wider focus on insights from the behavioural sciences.2
Over the last couple of decades, however, various challenges to the
prevailing view have begun to gain momentum. Here I will focus on
the idea, tested empirically by Mandel (2014), that the number ex-
pressions in framing problems may be interpreted lower-boundedly,
as denoting minimum rather than exact quantities. I will argue that
this hypothesis may support a rationalising explanation of framing
effects, but only on the basis of a fully worked-out theory of the
meanings of number expressions. Crucially, providing that founda-
tion will, in turn, require engagement with a conceptual distinction
heavily discussed in the philosophy of language, concerning the dif-
ference between semantics and pragmatics. Thus, I aim to show how
empirical and philosophical research is importantly intertwined, at
least in attempts to explain framing effects.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I describe
the standard gloss of risky-choice framing effects, which are thought
to reveal counter-normative reasoning. In section 3, I introduce the
hypothesis that recipients of the ADP interpret number expressions
as denoting lower-bounded quantities. I assess the empirical sup-
port for this hypothesis and argue that, although it may provide a
partial explanation of risky-choice framing effects, it does not yet
support a rationalising explanation; that would require showing that
the number expressions have lower-bounded meanings in the rele-
vant context. In section 4, I survey various accounts of the semantics
and pragmatics of number expressions and describe how these could
1 For surveys of the relevant psychological literature, see Kühberger 1998; Küh-
berger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner 1999; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998;
Steiger and Kühberger 2018.
2 For example, in 2010 the UK Government established the Behavioural Insights
Team (also known as the ‘Nudge Unit’), which has subsequently expanded into
a global social purpose company, working across public, private, and charitable
sectors.
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potentially license lower-bounded interpretations of the number ex-
pressions in the ADP. In section 5, I argue that endorsing any one
of these accounts will ultimately depend on philosophical arguments
about how to draw the boundary between semantics and pragmatics.
I conclude that empirical and philosophical research remain inex-
tricably linked in debates about framing, rationality, representation,
and meaning.
2 . Framing Effects and (Ir)rationality
Framing effects are standardly thought to be counter-normative be-
cause they violate the principle of ‘description invariance’, which
is taken to be an essential condition for rational decision-making.
Roughly speaking, the principle of description invariance requires
that, when two expressions obviously describe the same possible out-
come, that outcome should be represented and evaluated in the same
way under each description.3 It is thought to be obvious that, in each
framing condition of the ‘Asian Disease Problem’ (ADP), the same
pair of possible outcomes is being described and, therefore, that these
should be represented and evaluated by recipients in exactly the same
way. As we have seen, though, the empirical data show that people
actually evaluate them differently. In Tversky and Kahneman’s ex-
periment, a majority preferred the sure option (Program A) in the ‘be
saved’ condition, whereas, in the ‘die’ condition, a majority preferred
the risky option (Program D).4
Tversky and Kahneman explain the observed framing effect via
their theory of decision making under risk, known as ‘Prospect The-
ory’ (1979). Prospect Theory is put forward as a descriptively accu-
rate account of human decision-making, which diverges in important
ways from the normative ideal embodied in classical ‘Expected Util-
ity Theory’. I will focus solely on the following point of divergence
here: whereas Expected Utility Theory requires rational agents to
3 Spelling out the description invariance principle more precisely has proved dif-
ficult: for some further discussion, see Bermúdez 2009, 2018. The rough formulation
provided here will suffice for present purposes.
4 Not all subsequent studies have replicated this wholesale reversal of prefer-
ences. However, there is a very robust tendency for responses to shift, i.e. larger
proportions of participants typically prefer the sure option in the positively-worded
condition than in the negatively-worded condition (and, correspondingly, larger pro-
portions prefer the risky option in the negatively-worded condition than in the
positively worded condition). For further discussion of this point, see Kühberger
1998, p. 30; Levin et al. 1998, p. 153.
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have consistent attitudes to risk, Prospect Theory predicts that peo-
ple are relatively risk-averse when faced with potential gains, and
risk-seeking when faced with potential losses. To see the distinction,
consider a choice between the following options:
(1) A sure gain of $200.
(2) A 50% chance of gaining $400 and a 50% chance of gaining
$0.
Compare this with the choice between the following options:
(3) A sure loss of $200.
(4) A 50% chance of losing $400 and a 50% chance of losing $0.
According to Expected Utility Theory, a rational agent who is risk-
averse will select (1) and (3), while a rational agent who is risk-seeking
will select (2) and (4). However, that theory rules out the alternative
combinations —(1) and (4), or (2) and (3)— since these would imply
a change in risk attitude, based purely on whether one stands to gain
or lose the $200.
Prospect Theory predicts, in contrast, the selection of (1) and (4).
This is because people are assumed to be risk-averse when facing
gains (as in the choice between (1) and (2)) but risk-seeking when
facing losses (as in the choice between (3) and (4)). The shift in risk
attitude is dubbed a ‘reflection effect’ (since it seems to be caused by
‘reflecting’ the prospects around the zero-utility point).
The core idea is further extended to tasks in which the prospects
merely seem like gains or losses. As Kahneman and Tversky put it:
The reference point usually corresponds to the current asset position,
in which case gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts that
are received or paid. However, the location of the reference point, and
the consequent coding of outcomes as gains or losses, can be affected
by the formulation of the offered prospects, and by the expectations of
the decision maker. (p. 273)
A prominent way of making prospects seem like gains or losses is
by describing them with positive or negative wording, as in the two
conditions of the ADP. In the first condition, the options are said
to sound like gains because of the focus on the people who will ‘be
saved’. Therefore, participants tend to be risk-averse in this condi-
tion, preferring the sure option (Program A). Conversely, it is held
DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221 Crítica, vol. 52, no. 156 (diciembre 2020)
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that the options in the second condition sound like losses because
of the focus on the people who will ‘die’. And this is argued to ex-
plain why participants tend to be risk-seeking in the ‘die’ condition,
preferring the risky option (Program D).
Offering an explanation of the underlying psychological mecha-
nism at work, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, pp. 273–274) posit
an initial ‘editing’ phase in decision-making. This involves decision-
makers mentally representing the choice options in particular ways.
Of most relevance for current purposes, it is hypothesised that when
the options are worded positively they are represented (or ‘coded’) as
gains. Conversely, when the options are worded negatively they are
coded as losses. The implications of this editing process become evi-
dent in the subsequent ‘evaluation’ phase, in which decision-makers
assess the choice options before them. Where the alternatives have
been coded as gains, decision-makers are predicted to make risk-
averse choices. Conversely, where they have been coded as losses,
decision-makers are predicted to make risk-seeking choices. As a re-
sult, the choices are held to be doubly counter-normative: reasoning
errors are committed at both the editing phase (where outcomes are
irrationally represented in different ways) and the evaluation phase
(where this difference in representation irrationally affects choice).
Ultimately, what is distinctive about framing effects (as opposed to
mere ‘reflection effects’) is that the positive or negative wording in
the choice options cues the audience to represent the outcomes as
gains or losses during the editing phase.
It is worth noting that there is limited discussion in the literature
of exactly what counts as positive or negative wording.5 For my
purposes here, though, it will suffice to think of the valence of a
linguistic expression as depending straightforwardly on the goodness
or badness of what is denoted. Thus, for example, the expression
‘be saved’ is positive because being saved is typically a good thing,
whereas ‘die’ is negative because dying is typically bad. Of course,
there will not always be consensus about what counts as a good or
bad thing. However, I take it that the ADP scenario, which will be
my primary focus here, is sufficiently clear-cut.
As noted previously, it is standardly assumed that, in each con-
dition of the ADP, exactly the same two prospects are described.
Specifically, both of the sure options are thought to describe a cer-
5 For further discussion, which disentangles the effects of using positive or neg-
ative ‘root words’ from their affirmative or negational use, see Mandel 2001 and
Tombu and Mandel 2015.
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tain prospect of 200 people being saved and 400 dying. Meanwhile,
both of the risky options are thought to describe a one-third proba-
bility that 600 people will be saved (with none dying), together with
a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die (with none being
saved). This is taken to be obvious, at least once the conditions are
considered side by side.6 The only difference, then, is that, in the
first condition, the alternatives are framed positively (in terms of the
numbers of people who will ‘be saved’), whereas in the second con-
dition they are framed negatively (in terms of the numbers of people
who will ‘die’). Since this is seen as a superficial linguistic difference,
distinct representation of the prospects (as gains or losses) is taken to
violate the normative principle of description invariance. In sum, it
is standardly assumed that the pairs of alternative ‘frames’ —(5) and
(7) below; and (6) and (8)— have the same meaning, even though
they are typically represented differently in each framing condition.
(5) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
(6) If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that
600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no
people will be saved.
(7) If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
(8) If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that
nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people
will die.
If this is the right gloss of what is happening, framing effects clearly
evidence counter-normative behaviour. However, there are various
ways of challenging the claim that alternative frames have the same
meaning.7 Here I will focus on the ‘lower-bounding hypothesis’.
3 . Lower-Bounded Representations
For the alternative frames in the ADP to have the same meanings, the
number expressions would have to denote complementary quantities.
Consider again, for example, frames (5) and (7) reproduced below:
6 The equivalence assumption is thought to gain further empirical support from
the fact that people typically do take the alternative frames to be equivalent when
both are made available (Frisch 1993; Kühberger 1995; Mandel 2001; Stanovich and
West 1998).
7 See, for example, Berkeley and Humphreys 1982; Bohm and Lind 1992; Okder
2012. Also, for discussion of a related ‘attribute framing’ paradigm, see Sher and
McKenzie 2006.
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(5) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
(7) If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
These frames can only describe the same prospect if the quantities
of people being saved and dying sum to 600 (the total number of
people the disease is expected to kill).8 The complementarity of
the number expressions in turn requires that they have ‘bilateral’
meanings, whereby ‘200’ means no more and no less than 200, and
‘400’ means no more and no less than 400. In other words, the
number expressions must denote exact quantities.9
It has been suggested, however, that the number expressions
in the ADP are often interpreted unilaterally —specifically, lower-
boundedly, as denoting minimum quantities. For example, ‘200’ in
(5) may be represented as denoting at least 200, and ‘400’ in (7)
as denoting at least 400. Crucially, this ‘lower-bounding hypothesis’
stands to explain the classic risky choice framing effect. To see why,
consider what happens if (5) and (7) are interpreted as in (5a) and
(7a):
(5a) If Program A is adopted, at least 200 people will be saved.
(7a) If Program C is adopted, at least 400 people will die.
It is consistent with (5a) that more than 200 people will be saved
under Program A. In contrast, (7a) ensures that no more than 200
people will be saved under Program C, since at least 400 of the
600 will die. Therefore, Program A has the potential to save more
lives than Program C —it is a better prospect. In principle, then,
this could explain the observed shift in responses, towards the sure
option in the ‘be saved’ framing condition, and away from the
sure option in the ‘die’ condition. Importantly, that would be a dif-
ferent explanation than the Prospect Theoretic one which, as we saw,
depended on the positive wording (‘be saved’) in the first condition
giving the impression of gaining, while the negative wording (‘die’)
in the second condition gives the impression of losing.
8 Clearly, this is only a necessary condition for equivalence, and is not sufficient.
However, as mentioned at the end of the previous section, I will simply set aside
other factors for now.
9 Or, perhaps, approximate quantities —these would still be bilateral interpre-
tations, just less precise ones. For ease of exposition, I will equate ‘bilateral’ with
‘exact’, although nothing substantive in the argument hangs on this point.
Crítica, vol. 52, no. 156 (diciembre 2020) DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221
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The lower-bounding hypothesis has been mooted at various times
in the framing literature (going back, at least, to Macdonald 1986).
However, it is only recently that it has been the subject of direct
empirical investigation.10
3 . 1 . Empirical Evidence
In a striking study, Mandel (2014) presents evidence that ADP-style
risky-choice framing effects can depend on number expressions be-
ing represented lower-boundedly. In three experiments, he finds that
framing effects are eliminated entirely when participants are encour-
aged to form bilateral (‘exactly’) interpretations of number expres-
sions. Conversely, the effects are facilitated and amplified by encour-
aging participants to form lower-bounded (‘at least’) interpretations.
Moreover, when participants are asked how they interpreted the num-
ber expressions, framing effects are only evident among those who
report interpreting the number expressions as lower-bounded (not
bilateral).
Going through the findings in a little more detail, Mandel’s first
experiment deployed the ADP in a within-subjects design, such that
participants received both the ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ framing condi-
tions.11 For one group of participants, the sure options in each
framing condition included the modifier ‘exactly’ before the number
expression, as in (5b) and (7b) below.
(5b) If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved.
(7b) If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die.
For the remaining participants, the sure options contained the modi-
fier ‘at least’ before the number expression (as in (5a) and (7a) above).
In a related second experiment, Mandel used a between-subjects
design, so that each participant received the ADP in only one framing
condition (the ‘be saved’ or ‘die’ condition).12 In addition to the ‘at
least’ and ‘exactly’ conditions, this experiment included ‘no modifier’
10 Some closely related studies are reported by Halberg and Teigen 2009; Teigen
2011; Teigen and Nikolaisen 2009.
11 The order in which the two framing conditions were presented was counter-
balanced between subjects, and all participants also received a series of unrelated,
intervening ‘filler’ tasks.
12 In both Mandel’s second and third experiments, the following, modified, risky-
choice scenario was used:
In a war-torn region, the lives of 600 stranded people are at stake. Two
DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221 Crítica, vol. 52, no. 156 (diciembre 2020)
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conditions, in which the options were presented without the inclusion
of ‘exactly’ or ‘at least’ before the number expression (similarly to
the classic conditions of the ADP). The experiment thus included six





‘At least’ ‘Be saved’
‘At least’ ‘Die’
No modifier ‘Be saved’
No modifier ‘Die’
In line with the lower-bounding hypothesis, no framing effects were
observed in the ‘exactly’ conditions of either of Mandel’s first two ex-
periments. In other words, once the modifier ‘exactly’ was added, no
statistically significant difference was observed between the choices
made in the ‘be saved’ and ‘die’ conditions. In contrast, the ‘at least’
conditions led to large framing effects in the standard direction: sig-
nificantly larger proportions of participants chose the sure option in
the ‘be saved’ condition than in the ‘die’ condition (and, conversely,
significantly larger proportions chose the risky option in the ‘die’ con-
dition than in the ‘be saved’ condition). Meanwhile, the no-modifier
conditions in the second experiment yielded a medium-sized framing
effect. This is consistent with the hypothesis that some participants
were spontaneously adopting lower-bounded readings of the number
response plans with the following outcomes have been proposed. Assume that
the estimates provided are accurate.
This scenario, taken from Mandel 2001, was intended to make it more plausible
that the number of lives under threat could be accurately forecast. The options were
then phrased similarly to those in the ADP, except that: (i) the sure options included
the phrase ‘it is certain that’ before the number expressions; (ii) the risky options
removed reference to ‘people’, instead referring either to ‘all 600’ or ‘nobody’; (iii) in
the risky option of the ‘die’ framing condition, the order of the clauses was switched;
and (iv) each of the options referred to ‘Plans’ rather than ‘Programs’. Additionally,
Mandel used the following wording in the question to participants: ‘Which of the
two plans would you choose —A or B?’ It seems unlikely that these relatively minor
changes are responsible for the pattern of results Mandel obtains, most notably the
elimination of framing effects in the ‘exactly’ conditions (particularly since framing
effects were observed in the other conditions that used the same scenario).
Crítica, vol. 52, no. 156 (diciembre 2020) DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221
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expressions in these conditions (and that this is what is happening in
the classic version of the ADP).13
In his third experiment, Mandel manipulated what he calls the
‘explication’ of the sure and risky options. I will focus purely on
his manipulations of the sure options here. Mandel notes that, in the
classic ADP, the sure options are only ‘partially explicated’, leaving
implicit the fate of the remaining people (i.e. the 400 people who
will not be saved in the ‘be saved’ condition, and the 200 who will
not die in the ‘die’ condition).14 Mandel formulates ‘fully explicated’
versions of the sure options as follows:
(5c) If Plan A is adopted, it is certain that 200 people will be saved
and 400 people will not be saved.
(7c) If Plan C is adopted, it is certain that 400 people will die and
200 people will not die.
Using a between-subjects design, participants were thus divided be-
tween the four conditions represented in the rows of the table below:





Following the usual choice task, Mandel asked participants in the ‘be
saved’ conditions the following question:
Did you interpret Plan A to mean (a) at most, (b) exactly, or
(c) at least 200 will be saved?
In the ‘die’ condition the question read as follows:
Did you interpret Plan C to mean (a) at most, (b) exactly, or
(c) at least 400 will die?
13 Lending further support to this hypothesis, in the General Discussion, Mandel
discusses another preliminary experiment, in which over half of participants report
forming lower-bounded interpretations of the number expressions in the ADP.
14 Kühberger (1995) similarly argued that the partial explication of the sure op-
tions could be responsible for risky-choice framing effects. The explication point
has subsequently been developed in various ways, by Mandel 2001, Kühberger and
Tanner 2010, and Tombu and Mandel 2015.
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The results of this experiment showed, first, an effect of ‘explication’
on choice. Specifically, a standard framing effect arose from the
classic ADP conditions, in which the sure options were only partially
explicated. However, the effect was eliminated when the options were
fully explicated. This suggests that the framing effect may depend
on the partial explication of the sure options, which enables a lower-
bounded interpretation.
Indeed, Mandel found an effect of explication on the interpre-
tation of the number expressions: partially explicated sure options
were correlated with participants reporting lower-bounded (‘at least’)
readings of the number expressions. Conversely, fully explicated sure
options were correlated with participants reporting bilateral, ‘exactly’
readings of the number expressions. This result shows how lower-
bounded interpretations are linked to the sure options being only
partly explicated.
Finally, there was an interaction between choice patterns and in-
terpretations of number expressions: an overall framing effect was
observed for those sets of participants reporting lower-bounded read-
ings of the number expressions. Conversely, no framing effect was
observed for the sets of participants reporting bilateral readings. This
points to a direct link between lower-bounded interpretations and
framing effects.
Taken together, Mandel’s results suggest that ADP-style risky-
choice framing effects may be driven by some participants interpret-
ing the number expressions in the sure options as denoting lower-
bounded quantities. Mandel concludes:
In short, the findings indicate that, for most people, Options A and
C in the ADP are descriptions of different events, and not merely
re-descriptions of the same event. Although effects of the usual ADP
positive-negative manipulation are description effects, strictly speaking,
they are not framing effects, and thus should not be labeled as such.
(2014, p. 1193)
It is important to note at this point that a replication attempt by
Simmons and Nelson (2013) failed to confirm the results of Mandel’s
second experiment. Simmons and Nelson found statistically signifi-
cant framing effects, even under the ‘exactly’ conditions.15 Likewise,
Chick, Reyna, and Corbin (2016) still observe a framing effect when
15 See Mandel (2020) for a response to Simmons and Nelson, which points out
that there is no statistically significant difference between their two sets of results,
despite the disparity in the statistical significance of the framing effect. Mandel also
Crítica, vol. 52, no. 156 (diciembre 2020) DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1221
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they use the ‘exactly’ stimuli from Mandel’s second experiment.16 It
would be premature, then, to conclude that framing effects —even
ADP-style risky-choice framing effects— depend entirely on lower-
bounded representations of number expressions.17 Nevertheless, the
lower-bounding hypothesis may well provide an important, if partial,
explanation of framing effects. In the remainder of the paper, I will
focus on the issue of whether this explanation is a rationalising one.
3 . 2 . Lower-Bounding and Rationality
Mandel argues that most of the choices made by his participants
remain entirely in accord with the rational choice principle of de-
scription invariance: preferences did not shift once number expres-
sions were made explicitly complementary via the addition of ‘ex-
actly’; yet there was, justifiably, a shift where the number expressions
were made explicitly non-complementary, via the use of ‘at least’. In
Mandel’s own words: “The present findings [ . . . ] contribute to the
rationality debate [ . . . ] by showing that a significant majority of par-
ticipants made rational decisions by classical rational-choice criteria
in traditional risky-choice framing problems” (2014, p. 1194).
While this is correct, it is important to note that the lower-
bounding hypothesis does not yet provide a fully rationalising expla-
nation of classic risky-choice framing effects. Instead, where num-
ber expressions are not modified with ‘at least’, it remains an open
question whether it is rational to interpret them as denoting lower-
bounded, rather than bilateral, quantities. Recall that framing re-
searchers have standardly assumed that ‘200’ and ‘400’ in the ADP
have bilateral meanings (such that the sure options describe the same
outcome of 200 people being saved and 400 dying). If this is correct,
people’s ‘editing’ behaviour, to arrive at lower-bounded interpreta-
tions of the number expressions, would still be counter-normative.
They would still be making a mistake in the way they represent the
options (the mistake is simply different from that which Prospect
Theory attributes to them —rather than erroneously representing
notes a puzzling feature of Simmons and Nelson’s data: it suggests that participants
are largely insensitive to the difference between exact and lower-bounded quantities.
16 Although they use Mandel’s scenario and choice options, it is worth noting
that Chick et al. introduce a new set of pre-task instructions and questionnaires,
which are designed to secure bilateral readings of the number expressions even
more robustly.
17 Indeed, Tombu and Mandel (2015) themselves explore a separate explanation
of framing effects, which appeals essentially to the (positive, negative, or mixed)
valence of frames.
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prospects as gains or losses, they would be erroneously represent-
ing quantities as being lower-bounded rather than bilateral).
Of course, having arrived at lower-bounded interpretations, peo-
ple’s subsequent ‘evaluation’ behaviour is now justifiable: they be-
have reasonably in rating the sure option more highly in the ‘be
saved’ frame than in the ‘die’ frame.18 Importantly, though, as dis-
cussed above, it is people’s apparently irrational behaviour in the
editing phase which is distinctive of framing effects (as opposed
to mere reflection effects). Therefore, a rationalising explanation of
framing effects must ultimately show that people’s representations
of prospects can be justified (and not just their subsequent evalu-
ations). While Mandel’s results provide some reason to think the
number expressions in the ADP sometimes are interpreted lower-
boundedly, they do not yet demonstrate that they should be. As it
stands, then, the lower-bounding account falls short of rationalising
framing effects.
Recall, too, that Tversky and Kahneman themselves readily ac-
knowledge that people do represent outcomes differently under al-
ternative frames. Their claim is that they shouldn’t, if behaving
perfectly rationally. Given the Prospect Theoretic account of the
psychological mechanism underlying risky-choice framing effects, the
burden these theorists face is to show that alternative frames obvi-
ously share a common meaning, despite the use of positive or nega-
tive linguistic expressions.19 If framing effects turn out, instead, to
be explained by the lower-bounding hypothesis, then the normative
question turns on whether alternative frames still share a common
meaning, despite the use of one or other number expression.
Mandel does indicate that claims of counter-normativity may at
least be more difficult to maintain if the lower-bounding hypothesis is
accepted. He appeals to linguistic evidence that number expressions
can give rise to lower-bounded interpretations in certain contexts
(2014, p. 1186). However, Mandel explicitly defers further discussion
of which contexts licence lower-bounded interpretations. He writes:
18 Perhaps, then, there are two notions of rationality at play, linked respectively
to people’s editing behaviour (i.e. their interpretation of linguistic stimuli) and their
evaluation behaviour (i.e. their choice between the two options). I am grateful to
David Mandel for suggesting this and, although I cannot pursue the point here, I
believe it would be another interesting area of research for empirically informed
philosophy.
19 Again, this is debatable on various grounds but I will not pursue each one here.
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Although a specification of how various types of context (e.g., conver-
sational, semantic, and sentential) affect the interpretation of [numeric
quantifiers] is beyond the aims of this article, the present research
[ . . . ] suggests the need for a comprehensive psycholinguistic account
of numeric quantifier use and interpretation. (2014, p. 1196)
To reinforce Mandel’s point here, if the lower-bounding hypothesis is
to support a genuinely rationalising explanation of risky-choice fram-
ing effects, it will first be necessary to resolve the question of how
the number expressions in those paradigms should be interpreted
—in other words, what they mean. Mandel may recognise that this
is needed. However, others have interpreted him as straightforwardly
offering a rationalising explanation —including, for example, Chick
et al. 2016; McKenzie, Sher, Leong, and Müller-Trede 2018. Given
that the question of rationality is —and has always been— at the
heart of debates about framing, it is important to understand pre-
cisely which linguistic foundations could ground a genuinely ratio-
nalising incarnation of the lower-bounding account.
4 . The Meanings of Number Expressions
If the lower-bounding hypothesis is to provide a genuinely rationalis-
ing explanation of risky-choice framing effects, it must be shown
that experimental participants are rational to represent the num-
ber expressions as denoting lower-bounded quantities. Specifically,
it must be shown that such interpretations are licensed, on the basis
of the expressions having genuinely lower-bounded meanings in the
relevant contexts. In this section, I briefly survey various possible
arguments to that effect, drawing on an ongoing debate about the
semantics and pragmatics of number expressions.20 Although I will
not seek to provide a resolution, I will indicate how each position
could potentially support a rationalising account of framing effects.
Note that none of them actually does so as yet. Jumping ahead for a
moment, in section 5 I will argue that choosing between the positions,
in pursuit of the requisite justification, will ultimately require deeper
philosophical engagement.
While it is widely recognised that number expressions obtain
lower-bounded readings in certain contexts, some theorists have
sought to trace this back to the expressions’ conventional seman-
tics, while others have attributed it to their pragmatic enrichment
in particular contexts of use. I begin by discussing the traditional
20 For a fuller survey of this debate, see Spector 2013.
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neo-Gricean view, which has been put forward, for example, by Horn
(1989) and Levinson (2000). They take number expressions to be
lower-bounded as a matter of conventional meaning. On the neo-
Gricean view, then, ‘200’ conventionally denotes at least 200, while
‘400’ conventionally denotes at least 400. If correct, this would ren-
der sentences like (5) and (7) inequivalent to one another at a basic
semantic level. While the theorists in this camp readily acknowledge
that number expressions are sometimes interpreted as denoting bilat-
eral (or upper-bounded) quantities, this is thought to be the result of
pragmatic modulation of the conventional meaning, in light of wider
contextual considerations.
If number expressions have conventionally lower-bounded mean-
ings, that might already be thought sufficient to license their being
represented as lower-bounded. For example, according to some se-
mantic theories, conventional meanings are always psychologically
realised during successful linguistic communication.21 Of course,
showing that the conventional meanings should also be deployed in
making evaluative judgements would be a further step.22 Indeed, par-
ticipants’ choice behaviour might still be thought to violate rational
choice principles. This is because it is unclear whether they ought to
evaluate the options on the basis of (conventionally-derived) lower-
bounded representations, or (pragmatically-derived) bilateral ones.
Consider, for example, how pragmatic enrichment of the number
expression might be expected to proceed on a standard Gricean anal-
ysis:23 given a statement of (5), if more than 200 people would be
saved under Program A, then presumably that would have been
stated explicitly —at least if we assume that the number of people
who will be saved is known, and that the information being provided
is accurate, relevant, and so on. Since (5) does not state that more
than 200 people will be saved, it may be legitimate to infer that
21 See, for example, Cappelen and Lepore 2005.
22 In general, there will always be a further step to argue that a representation
arrived at during the ‘editing’ phase should be deployed in the ‘evaluation’ phase.
However, it is first necessary to demonstrate that a lower-bounded interpretation can
reasonably and justifiably be derived; if not, there would be no hope of giving the
lower-bounding hypothesis a rational basis. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer
for pressing me on this point.
23 I intend to remain neutral here on whether audiences actually reason in this
way. However, this is a question which has received considerable attention in the
literature on Gricean pragmatics (see, for example, Geurts and Rubio-Fernández
2015; Saul 2002).
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no more than 200 will be saved —in other words, that exactly 200
people will be saved.24
Given this Gricean rationale, is it still possible to justify a lower-
bounded interpretation of the number expression (and an evaluation
based on that interpretation), rather than a bilateral one? Perhaps.
After all, it is not obvious that the number of people who will be
saved is really known; the vignette explicitly states that the figures
are estimates. Therefore, the reason for failing to state that more than
200 people will be saved could be a purely epistemic one —it is sim-
ply unknown how many people beyond the first 200 will eventually
be saved. On that basis, participants might be rational to stick with
the conventional lower-bounded meaning of the number expression,
leaving open the possibility that more than 200 people will be saved,
rather than adopting a pragmatically-enriched, bilateral interpreta-
tion.25
On the other hand, participants are explicitly instructed to as-
sume that the options provide exact scientific estimates of the con-
sequences. That might be considered to give them a good reason to
adopt bilateral interpretations of the number expressions. Ultimately,
then, whether or not the deployment of lower-bounded interpreta-
tions can be justified —and the framing effects that result— will
depend on precisely how the discourse context functions to constrain
meaning. As Mandel indicates in the earlier quote, this is an issue
for wider research in linguistic pragmatics to address. For now, then,
a rationalising explanation remains possible but not secure.
A distinct approach to the conventional semantics of number ex-
pressions takes these expressions to be ambiguous, or polysemous,
having multiple lexical entries, or senses. Geurts (2006) develops an
analysis along these lines. He argues that number expressions have
both bilateral and lower-bounded senses (although he takes the bilat-
eral senses to be more basic and generally dominant).
Adopting an ambiguity or polysemy view of number expressions,
one would then need to show that it is reasonable to adopt lower-
bounded interpretations of the number expressions in the ADP.
As before, the task of showing that is made somewhat harder by
24 And, of course, a similar explanation could be provided for the alternative
frame in (7).
25 Moreover, it is perhaps notable that (5) fails to state explicitly how many people
will not be saved, whereas the risky option in (6) does so. This point of contrast
between the two options might indicate that there is some uncertainty about the
outcome of Program A, further justifying a lower-bounded interpretation of the
number expression.
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the fact that participants are told that the options provide exact
scientific estimates, which might be expected to prime a bilateral
interpretation (and, if that interpretation is also the dominant one, as
Geurts suggests, then selecting the lower-bounded sense would seem
especially odd). Only if a satisfactory explanation can be given here
would risky-choice framing effects be consistent with the principle of
description invariance. In the end, this will depend on our theory of
how alternative senses should be selected in context.
Another approach claims that number expressions have under-
specified conventional semantics. In other words, the expressions
themselves have neither bilateral nor lower-bounded denotations.
This view has been advocated by Kempson and Cormack (1981) and
Carston (1988, 1998). They argue that, on each occasion of use, the
underspecified conventional meaning of a number expression must be
pragmatically enriched in one way or other, so that the audience ar-
rives at a lower-bounded or bilateral (or, potentially, upper-bounded)
interpretation.26
26 In this regard, it is interesting to consider the additional study described by
Mandel in the General Discussion of his 2014 paper. This study aims to shed light
on some empirical results obtained by Jou, Shanteau, and Harris (1996). Jou et al.
find that risky-choice framing effects can be eliminated by providing a rationale
for the outcomes and probabilities associated with each option. For example, their
version of the ADP states that:
Without treatment, a person who has contracted the disease will die in a
few days. Six hundred people have been diagnosed as having contracted the
disease. Some substance, extracted from living human organs and extremely
difficult to obtain, can cure the disease. Unfortunately, there is only enough
of this substance for 200 people.
Mandel hypothesises that this encourages recipients to interpret the sure option in
the ‘be saved’ condition as saving at most 200 people (since the quantity of the
curative substance is known to be upper-bounded), whereas the sure option in the
‘die’ condition is still most naturally understood to result in at least 400 people dy-
ing. (Arguably, though, in Jou et al.’s original experiment, ‘exact’ interpretations are
equally justified, since the task instructions state: “Your estimate of the likelihood
of the occurrence of some event should be strictly based on the probabilities given
you in each problem, not based on your personal intuitions or experience about the
likelihood of a certain event’s occurring”; however, I will ignore this wrinkle for
now). Taken together, the two interpretations —‘at most 200’ and ‘at least 400’—
would make the sure option in the ‘be saved’ frame just as unappealing as it is in
the ‘die’ frame, thus explaining the absence of a framing effect. In line with the
hypothesis, participants in Mandel’s initial study generally did reject an ‘exactly’
interpretation of ‘200’, subsequently endorsing an ‘at most’ interpretation. And they
tended to reject an ‘exactly’ interpretation of ‘400’, subsequently endorsing an ‘at
least’ interpretation. This is further evidence that different interpretations of the
number expressions can be contextually induced. It would be too quick, though, to
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Given an underspecification view, the lower-bounding hypothesis
would provide a rationalising explanation of risky-choice framing ef-
fects just if participants could be justified in enriching number ex-
pressions lower-boundedly in those contexts. Whether that is so will
depend on precisely how such enrichment is supposed to proceed,
i.e. which contextual factors may be taken into account, and how
they are to be integrated within the interpretation process. That, in
turn, will require a rich, psychological theory of interpretation.27
The final account I canvas here has been advocated by Breheny
(2008), who analyses number expressions as having straightforwardly
bilateral conventional meanings. Breheny recognises that such ex-
pressions may obtain lower-bounded interpretations in certain con-
texts, but this is taken to be the result of pragmatic enrichment
(specifically, he appeals to the role of background knowledge in
generating unilateral meanings). In this sense, Breheny’s position is
diametrically opposed to the neo-Gricean approach discussed above.
On a Breheny-style account, the question of whether lower-bound-
ed interpretations are rational would depend, again, on our final
pragmatic theory (including how individuals’ background knowledge
should be brought to bear during interpretation). So long as par-
ticipants can be justified in deriving enriched, lower-bounded inter-
pretations of the number expressions in the ADP, they would not
be violating the principle of description invariance; there would be
an important sense in which the number expressions actually have
lower-bounded meanings in that context.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the ability of the ap-
proaches described here to support a fully rationalising explanation
of framing effects will depend on our final theory of one or more
aspects of linguistic communication. In the meantime, the jury is
draw any conclusions about the semantics of number expressions. In particular, the
fact that participants tend to interpret ‘200’ as meaning at most 200 in the context of
this scenario does not show that number expressions are semantically underspecified.
It remains possible that people can still distinguish between the literal semantics of
the expression (whether lower-bounded, exact, or ambiguous between the two) and
information inferable from the wider context (i.e. that there is only enough of the
substance for 200 people and that, although it ‘can’ cure the disease, perhaps it
will not turn out to be successful for all 200). The suggestion, then, is that Mandel’s
experiment successfully probed pragmatic interpretations, without necessarily telling
us anything about the semantics of number expressions themselves.
27 According to the Relevance Theoretic approach endorsed by Carston, the lower-
bounded interpretation would need to have a sufficiently important effect on a
participant’s beliefs to justify his/ her cognitive effort in deriving it (Carston 2002;
Sperber and Wilson 1995).
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out on whether participants ultimately behave rationally in deriving
and deploying lower-bounded representations of number expressions
during risky-choice framing tasks. At most, each approach explains
how participants arrive at those interpretations (semantically or prag-
matically), but not whether they are the best interpretations to adopt,
all things considered. That said, it is equally clear that it would be
premature to conclude that framing effects are counter-normative.
Thus, the lower-bounding hypothesis at least leaves in play the possi-
bility that framing effects are rational. The importance of this result
should not be downplayed, given how widespread and influential the
opposite conclusion has become.
The contribution of the discussion in this section has been to
outline various ways in which Mandel’s empirical analysis could po-
tentially be deepened, by appeal to a foundational account of the
meanings of number expressions. One such account will ultimately
be required if the lower-bounding hypothesis is to support a fully
rationalising explanation of framing effects. Having established this,
the point I want to emphasise in the next section of the paper
is that deciding between these foundational positions will require
empirically-engaged philosophy.
5 . The Semantics-Pragmatics Divide
The question of what number expressions mean, at semantic and
pragmatic levels, depends in large part on how we define the con-
cepts of semantics and pragmatics, and where we draw the boundary
between the two. This is a project which has exercised philosophers of
language for many years. Although we are, of course, free to stipulate
how technical terminology is used, presumably an important objec-
tive is for the concepts of semantics and pragmatics to have genuine
explanatory value, and this should guide their definition and dis-
tinction. Even granting this point, though, the semantics-pragmatics
boundary is unlikely to fall out automatically from pure empirical
inquiry, since we must first agree which real-world phenomena we
are trying to explain. For illustration, below I briefly consider three
metaphysical distinctions we may want the semantics-pragmatics di-
vide to track (and there are almost certainly others). Depending on
how this conceptual issue is resolved, it may prove possible to en-
dorse one of the approaches described in section 4, thus providing
the basis for a genuinely rationalising explanation of framing effects.
First, the purpose of semantics could be thought of as tracking cer-
tain conventional effects on interpretation, which depend on arbitrary
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features of language, such as the fact that the word ‘fire’ in English
means fire. Meanwhile, pragmatics could track meanings that emerge
from non-conventional contextual effects: for example, the sentence
‘There’s a fire’ is used to vastly different effect when it is uttered
to other passengers in a crowded underground station, as opposed
to one’s friends as they walk into a warm pub. Lepore and Stone
(2015) have recently elaborated a view which treats conventionality
as the hallmark of semantics (but, in the process, absorbs all kinds
of interpretive effects into the category of semantics, which have not
traditionally been considered part of conventional meaning).
Others have proposed a psychological grounding for semantics
and pragmatics, seeking to map them to distinct kinds of cognitive
process. According to Relevance Theory, for example, semantic pro-
cessing involves the decoding of linguistic stimuli, whereas pragmatic
processing is governed by an entirely different cognitive efficiency
principle (Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 1995). Borg also maps
semantics and pragmatics to different (modular vs. non-modular) psy-
chological systems (Borg 2004, 2012) —although it should be noted
that her view of the contextual effects on meaning diverges impor-
tantly from that of Relevance Theorists.
Another way to draw the boundary would be by appeal to norma-
tive criteria derived from our everyday communicative practices. The
idea here would be that semantics could track those meanings that
are hardest for speakers to retract, and to which they remain strictly
committed. In contrast, pragmatic meanings may be relatively easy
to cancel or deny. Saul (2013) adopts this kind of approach in map-
ping the difference between lying and misleading to the difference
between what is ‘said’ and what is conveyed less directly. See also
Borg 2017 for discussion of how speakers’ liabilities track semantic
and pragmatic differences.
If we are lucky, each of these ways of understanding semantic and
pragmatic meaning will be perfectly aligned, sorting communicated
contents in exactly the same way into one basket or the other. Per-
haps more likely, though, we will need to make explicit decisions
about which distinction to track. Such decisions are ones to which
philosophers of language are particularly well-equipped to contribute.
The question of how to draw the semantics-pragmatics boundary
will feed directly into the analysis of the meaning of number expres-
sions. For example, if semantics and pragmatics are held to track
distinct cognitive processes, we would expect the semantic and prag-
matic meanings of number expressions to have different psycholog-
ical signatures (perhaps being derived at different speeds, involving
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different regions of the brain, or being susceptible to different kinds
of interference). Alternatively, if we adopt a normative criterion, the
semantics and pragmatics of number expressions ought to reflect our
ordinary communicative practices. Therefore, in order to evaluate the
views surveyed in the previous section, we need to establish which
real-world phenomena the posited meanings should be tracking.
The upshot of this (necessarily cursory) discussion, then, is that
distinguishing and deciding between the defining criteria of semantic
and pragmatic meanings is essential for choosing between analyses
of the meanings of number expressions. As we saw, settling on one
of these analyses will, in turn, be a necessary step towards rendering
the lower-bounding hypothesis a rationalising explanation of risky-
choice framing effects. In this way, then, further exploration of an
empirical debate in psychological framing research has led us inex-
orably to a foundational philosophical question concerning the na-
ture of semantic and pragmatic meaning. Looking back in the other
direction, it is clear that empirically informed discussions in the
philosophy of language have demonstrable application in advancing
framing research and its associated real-world impacts.
6 . Conclusion
In the case of risky-choice framing effects —and, in particular, the
hypothesis that lower-bounded interpretations of number expressions
can explain these effects— empirical and philosophical inquiries are
importantly intertwined. I have argued that competing explanations
of the representation and evaluation of alternative frames depend,
ultimately, on foundational issues in the philosophy of language,
concerning semantics, pragmatics, and the interface between the two.
In doing so, I hope to have indicated how, by reaching across dis-
ciplinary boundaries, philosophers can shed light on the conceptual
questions pervading empirical work, and can contribute positively to
the development of scientific research. Of course, it remains to be
seen how representative this case study is of wider epistemic inquiry.
However, it would perhaps not be too surprising to discover that sci-
ence and philosophy are profoundly and pervasively entangled across
the piece.28
28 This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council,
via the South, West and Wales Doctoral Training Partnership (grant number
AH/L503939/1). I would like to thank Emma Borg, Nat Hansen, and David Mandel
for invaluable feedback on earlier versions of the paper. I am also extremely grateful
for comments provided by Crítica’s editorial board and reviewers.
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